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ABSTRACT
　本研究は，新しい道徳的態度尺度 Moral Attitude Questionnaire （MAQ）を作成し，その信頼性を検討し
た．MAQは，結果主義的態度と常識的道徳と一致する非結果主義的態度を対比させることによって道徳
的態度と予期された行動における個人差および文化差を測定する尺度である．1 つのカテゴリーにつき 5 
つのストーリーを作成し，5 カテゴリーから成る計25ストーリー設定した．結果として，「作為‐不作為」
に対する態度および「家族への贔屓」に対する態度に関しては十分な信頼性が得られたが，「因果応報」
に対する態度および「理性的な自殺」に対する態度における信頼性は予測よりも高いものではなかった．
また，「犠牲者数の重視」に対する態度における信頼性は低かった．回答者は，一般的に道徳的態度とし
ては家族への贔屓はよくないと考えていたが，実際の行動としては家族を贔屓する傾向があった．さら
に，男性回答者は女性回答者より態度レベルでも予期された行動レベルでも家族を贔屓する傾向が示さ
れた．
 The reliability of the newly constructed Moral Attitude Questionnaire (MAQ) was tested in this pilot study. 
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Introduction
 All humans hold and express moral attitudes. 
Moral attitudes include moral judgments such 
as “ r igh t o r wrong” and “b lamewor thy or 
praiseworthy”. Moral attitudes are also present when 
states of the world are described in terms of “good” or 
“bad” and “better or worse” as this tells us something 
about the values and worldview of the speaker. Big 
differences exist in what people describe as good or 
right. These differences in attitudes are found when 
comparing cultures or groups (cultural level) but also 
when comparing individuals within the same group 
of people (individual level) and when comparing the 
attitudes the same person expresses under different 
circumstances (situational level). The aim of this 
pilot study was to create an instrument that can 
measure individual and cultural differences in moral 
attitudes on a scale with “very consequentialistic 
attitudes” and “very common sense congruent non-
consequentialistic moral attitudes” as two theoretical 
extremes. The concepts of consequentialism, non-
consequentialism and common sense morality are 
discussed below.  In addition, the present study 
investigates two types of moral responses - moral 
attitude and expected behavior - in order to avoid 
confusion between what participants think they 
morally should do (attitudes), and what they think 
they would do (expected behavior). 
Consequentialistic and Non-consequentialistic 
Attitudes: A classification 
 This paper will adopt a distinction common in both 
moral philosophy (see chapters 13-22 in Singer, 
2005a), and contemporary moral psychology, and 
will classify attitudes and judgments as either 
consequentialistic or non-consequentialistic (Bartels, 
2008; Greene, 2007; Lombrozo, 2009). 
 Within philosophy, consequentialism is conceptualized 
as being focused on consequences and as being 
exclusively forward-looking, aggregative and 
maximizing (Pettit, 2005). Furthermore, agent 
neutrality or universalism is an element of most 
consequentialistic theories (Darwall, 2005). How 
the desirable consequences should be understood 
is a matter of ongoing controversy, but usually 
consequentialists propose well-being of some 
kind (Darwall, 2005; Goodin, 2005). In this paper 
consequentialistic attitudes will be broadly defined 
as forward-looking, aggregative, agent-neutral 
attitudes, with a conscious final aim of maximizing 
the total amount of well-being while minimizing the 
total amount of suffering. 
 From a psychological point of view, consequentialism 
can be explained as a generalized aversion against 
suffering and a generalized fondness for pleasure. 
This is in line with what Haidt & Graham (2007) 
describe as the harm-foundation of moral attitudes. 
The MAQ aims to assess individual and cultural differences in moral attitudes and expected behavior on a 
broad scale, contrasting typically consequentialistic attitudes with typically non-consequentialistic attitudes 
congruent with common sense morality. Five representative categories with five stories in each were tested. 
It was found that attitudes towards the intentional act/foreseen omission doctrine and attitudes towards family 
partiality could be measured in a reliable way. The stories measuring attitudes towards retributive punishment 
and attitudes towards rational suicide showed mixed inter-correlations.  Attitudes towards the moral weight 
of “number of victims” could not be measured in a reliable way. Participants reported expecting themselves 
to behave with greater partiality than they believed they should from a moral perspective. Male participants 
revealed a greater degree of partiality than female participants on both the attitude and the expected behavior 
levels.
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The negative evaluation against harm seems 
to be relatively universal among cultures, and 
learned during infancy (Haidt & Graham, 2007). 
Also, the aggregating and maximizing nature 
of consequentialism makes it similar to a cost-
benefit analysis. Moral cost-benefit analyses are 
characteristically complex and demand effortful 
contemplation. This has led several researchers to 
propose a connection between cognitive capacities, 
such as working memory, and consequentialistic 
moral attitudes (Greene, 2007; Moore et al., 2008). 
Research also supports the idea that when people 
engage in slow, effortful deliberation, they reach 
more consequentialistic judgments than when they 
are making moral judgments in a quick, intuitive and 
unconscious way (Greene et al., 2008).  
 Non-consequentialistic moral attitudes are 
addressed by a broad range of philosophical theories 
of morality such as deontology, right-based ethics, 
virtue ethics and contractarianism (See Singer, 
2005a). These theories vary in what kind of conduct 
they propose as morally correct, but they are united 
by the characteristic that they place value on things 
other than just consequences. Deontology denies 
that consequences have any moral weight at all. 
Instead, morally right behavior stems from the 
categorical imperatives. Virtue ethics takes a more 
holistic approach to morality and is concerned with 
what kind of individual the good person is rather 
than what kinds of actions that are good or bad 
(Foot, 1978). Even if non-consequentialism is not 
a unified ethical theory, it can be used to illustrate 
the theoretical opposite of consequentialism. Before 
proceeding to a description of some of the most 
prominent differences between consequentialism and 
non-consequentialism, the idea of common sense 
morality is discussed briefly.
Common Sense Morality
 The extreme consequentialist and the extreme 
non-consequentialist positions are theoretical 
examples meant to illustrate the differences between 
two philosophical theories. A more widespread 
source of moral motivation is the so-called “common 
sense morality”. Common sense morality is what 
normal persons “know” or “feel” to be good or bad 
without being able to explain why, and without any 
access to underlying principles. Common sense 
morality is often seen as consisting of a set of 
attitudes that is more or less taken as self-evident and 
manifested in humans in the form of an “gut-feeling” 
or “moral intuition” (Greene, 2007;  Sunstein, 
2005). This gut-feeling is usually a product of our 
autonomic response system (Damasio, 1994). It is 
unconsciously conveyed to us mainly via emotions 
(Haidt, 2001), and hence is very easy to rely on, and 
difficult to act against (Haidt & Kesebir, in press). 
In some situations common sense morality will 
follow a typically consequentialistic rationale. For 
example, few people these days would agree with 
Kant’s view stressing the total unimportance of 
consequences and well-being. However, in other 
cases common sense morality can be very non-
consequentialistic. It is especially in these areas, 
where consequentialism and common sense morality 
pull in different moral directions, where the main 
interest of this research resides.
Five Non-Consequentialistic Categories
 Despite Greene’s (2007) fascinating theory 
about deontology and consequentialism as the 
results of two separate neural systems in the brain, 
it might be too early to say that consequentialistic 
attitudes are the result of a stable “consequentialistic 
personality”. Therefore five sub-categories, that all 
have been comprehensively discussed within the 
fields of moral psychology and moral philosophy, 
were chosen for this pilot study. The categories 
chosen were: Attitudes towards the intentional 
act/foreseen omission doctrine; attitudes towards 
family partiality; attitudes towards the importance 
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of number of victims; attitudes about retributive 
punishment; and attitudes towards (rational) suicide. 
 In each category there exists one stereotypical 
consequentialistic answer and one opposite 
stereotypical answer that is both non-consequentialistic 
and also an accepted part of common sense morality. 
Research supports the idea that framed presentation 
of dilemmas and context vividness (Björklund, 
Haidt, & Murphy, 2000), together with stable 
individual differences (Bartels, 2008; Greene, 
in press), and cultural norm differences (Haidt, 
Koller & Dias, 1993) can predict the likelihood 
that a certain participant will express typically 
consequentialistic attitudes or typically non-
consequentialistic attitudes in each of these five 
categories. There is no assertion here that this list of 
categories is exhaustive and complete. However, it 
can be said to illustrate the core differences between 
consequentialism and non-consequentialistic 
common sense morality.
Intentional act/ foreseen omission doctrine.
 This category is a merger of two famous doctrines 
– the act/omission doctrine and the intentionality 
doctrine. For a consequentialist, there is no intrinsic 
difference between acts or omissions, or if the 
results are intentional or merely foreseen.  For a non-
consequentialist, this difference is absolutely central 
(Glover, 1977).  
 The act/omission doctrine can be illustrated by 
contrasting a case where the subject actively harms 
or kills another person with a case where the subject 
neglects to help a victim. For a consequentialist, 
the cases are of equal moral value as long as the 
consequences (including side-effects) are the same 
(Glover, 1977).  For a non-consequentialist, the 
intentional act of killing is unconditionally forbidden 
while neglecting to help is not. Morally worse 
behavior is likely to be unconsciously interpreted as 
“actively doing” as opposed to “passively allowing” 
(Cushman, Young & Hauser, 2006). 
 The act/omission doctrine is related to but not 
identical to the idea of intentionality and this non-
consequentialistic distinction is also well researched 
(Mele & Cushman, 2007; Hauser et al., 2007). 
Intended harm is, according to deontology and 
common sense, morally worse than the harm that 
is merely a foreseen side-effect. For a hardcore 
consequentialist, this is not the case. For non-
consequentialists but not for consequentialists, an 
intentional active act of harming will be judged 
much worse than a foreseen omission to not help, 
even when the total harm in the latter scenario is 
significantly larger.
 Using the famous trolley dilemma and its variations 
(Cushman & Young 2009; Greene et al., 2001; Greene, 
2007; Waldmann & Dietrich, 2007), interesting facts 
about people’s common sense morality have been 
discovered. While 80-90% of the respondents 
believe it to be acceptable to sacrifice one person in 
order to save five by redirecting a train, only 10 % 
believe it to be acceptable to do it by pushing a man 
in front of the train (Greene, et al., 2001). It seems 
that intentional acts combined with a high degree 
of directness “push our moral buttons efficiently,” 
and makes us more critical (Greene et al., 2009). 
According to the cold-heart heuristic this might be 
because people who are mentally competent to harm 
intentionally and directly are seen as cold-hearted 
and cruel while this is not the case when it comes 
to merely foreseen harm resulting from omissions 
(Sunstein, 2005). Paharia et al., (2009) support this 
idea as they found that indirect harm (via someone 
else) is judged less harshly than direct harm. 
Partiality.
 While consequentialism is strictly agent-neutral, 
non-consequentialism, and common sense morality 
are agent-relative (Darwall, 2005). A consequentialist 
would argue that the relation the acting subject has to 
the people involved lacks direct moral significance. 
Instead it is simply the number of persons involved 
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and the changes in their respective well-being that 
are important. There are many different types of 
in-groups and out-groups and the common reaction 
towards discriminating between these depends to 
a high degree on which in-group that is discussed. 
To morally discriminate between human and non-
human animals is still accepted (Singer, 1990), but to 
discriminate explicitly on the basis of race or sex is 
unacceptable.
 One of the most concrete and extreme examples 
of how common sense morality can go against 
consequentialism is seen in attitudes towards 
partiality shown to one’s own offspring. From a 
psychological perspective, the tendency to care for 
our in-group and especially for our own children has 
increased the chances of survival, and can be seen as 
the “descriptive default” of human behavior (Haidt 
& Kesebir, in press). It seems that evolution has 
endowed human beings with an emotional tendency 
to treat one’s own children better than unknown 
children (Greene, 2007).
 However, it is not this tendency toward partiality 
in and of itself that distinguishes consequentialists 
and non-consequentialists but rather the moral 
legitimacy one gives to this tendency (Greene, 2007; 
Singer, 2005b).  A stereotypical consequentialist will 
see our tendency to be partial or unconditional in our 
love as a moral limitation or as a shortcoming, albeit 
in many cases an unavoidable one. In contrast, many 
non-consequentialists will see our tendency toward 
partiality as indicative of an absolute need to fulfill 
one’s duty or as an aspect of our moral wisdom. For 
a non-consequentialist, it is not only psychologically 
odd to prefer to help a large number of strangers 
instead of one’s own family, it is also morally 
despicable. 
Importance of number of victims. 
 Consequentialism is per definition aggregating 
and maximizing while non-consequentialism is not. 
The demands on maximization mean that while it 
for a non-consequentialist is acceptable to refrain 
from doing the maximal good as long as one is doing 
something good, the consequentialist will claim that 
the morally best action is the action that will result 
in the highest total increase (or lowest decrease) 
of well-being. The consequentialist will judge a 
charitable act that helps 200 persons as four times 
better than a charitable act that helps 50 persons 
while the non-consequentialist will be relatively 
uncaring as long as the motivation to help exists. 
This non-consequentialistic tendency is in line with 
virtue ethics and is in many contexts a part of our 
common sense morality. 
 Moral psychology has provided much insight into 
the nature of human moral cognition. Identification 
with the victim(s) strongly predicts the tendency 
to help (Greene, 2007). A single child trapped in 
a well, will evoke much stronger emotions than 
reading a notice about a large number of victims in 
a distant refugee camp (Haidt & Kesebir, in press). 
Interestingly, Jenni & Loewenstein (1997) showed 
that rather than the actual number of victims saved, 
people make decisions on the basis of how large a 
percentage of the potential victims that can be saved. 
In a similar sense, depending on whether a dilemma 
is presented in a vivid fashion or in a cold and 
objective way, this will alter most people’s reactions 
even if the content is left unchanged (Bartels, 2008). 
Legitimacy of retribution.
 Consequentialism is exclusively forward looking 
while non-consequentialism is not (Dolinko, 
2005; Ten, 2005). This can be seen, for example, 
in the context of retributive punishment, and is 
one classical dispute between consequentialists 
and non-consequentialists. A consequentialist will 
punish criminals for their wrongdoing solely on 
the basis of future consequences (Dolinko, 2005; 
Greene & Cohen, 2004). Future consequences 
include rehabilitation of criminals, protection of 
the society, and prevention of future crimes. A non-
Educational Studies 52
International Christian University
101
consequentialist might accept these reasons, but 
still believe that there are more reasons to punish 
than mere consequences (e.g., Rogers, 2007). 
According to the deontologist, a criminal deserves to 
be punished even if this will not improve the future 
consequences and justice cannot be achieved unless 
the criminal is punished in proportion to the crime 
committed (Ten, 2005).  
 A variety of psychological studies indicate that 
the best predictor of preferred punishment is how 
angry or outraged the person making the judgment 
is at the moment (Greene, 2007). Sunstein (2005) 
characterizes the outrage heuristic as a general 
tendency to put faith in one’s emotional response 
towards a situation. If one’s emotional reaction 
is weak, the willingness to punish is small, but if 
the emotional reaction is strong, the willingness 
to punish is proportionally large. The justice and 
reciprocity-foundation advocated by Haidt & 
Graham (2007) also has some overlap with the idea 
of legitimate retributive punishment. For people 
with a strong sense of justice, to leave a wrongdoing 
unpunished is a moral problem even in cases where 
the total amount of suffering would be clearly lower.
 
Suicide. 
 Even if most people see well-being as something 
important, non-consequentialistic common sense 
usually propose that there are other important values 
as well, and that there exist non-negotiable rules 
(Baron & Spranca, 1997; Tetlock, 2003). Of the 
many possible illustrations of this, suicide will be 
considered here (Anderberg, 1989). Suicide involves 
a direct intervention in matters of life and death 
which is often seen as problematic. Obviously, there 
are consequentialistic arguments against suicide (such 
as grief for friends and family). However, even when 
controlling for consequentialistic aspects, some 
people see suicide as immoral (Anderberg, 1989).  In 
short, while a consequentialist will admit that suicide 
can be rational, acceptable and even preferable in 
some tragic cases, many non-consequentialists will 
refute this and claim that suicide never is the best 
choice. 
 According to Haidt, Koller & Dias (1993), the 
tendency to think non-consequentialistically is 
unavoidable as most people have other moral 
foundations than simply a generalized aversion 
toward harm. One of these other foundations is 
based on the moral emotion of disgust. Disgust was 
originally beneficial for species survival as it made 
people emotionally averse toward evolutionary 
harmful conduct such as eating rotten food or sibling 
incest. The emotion of disgust has evolved over 
time and these days also involves social disgust, for 
example, towards people who are unthankful, selfish, 
or exhibit unusual but otherwise harmless sexual 
desires (Haidt & Graham, 2007)
 On a related topic, Sunstein (2005) presents a 
heuristic called “do not tamper with nature”. That 
something is artificial or unnatural often gives 
people an automatic negative emotional response, 
even in cases when the unnatural will lead to better 
consequences. Suicide can be seen as an unnatural 
interference that evokes disgust and other moral 
emotions, but that also occasionally decrease the 
total suffering.
Level of Analysis
 The benefit of using narrow stories such as the 
trolley-dilemma, is that it allows researchers to 
control the story and manipulate very small details 
one at the time, thereby allowing observations of 
how people’s judgments change in the different 
conditions (Cushman & Young, 2009). However, 
the use of narrow dilemmas also has a downside in 
reduced ecological validity. 
 The originality of the present study resides in the 
broad range of moral stories chosen to measure the 
different categories. The purpose of constructing 
the Moral Attitude Questionnaire (MAQ) is to 
create stories that are not identical, take place in 
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different contexts, but still measure the hypothesized 
underlying predisposition to answer in a certain way. 
If the categories within the instrument exhibit decent 
internal reliability, then they can be used in future 
research directed towards measuring individual and 
cultural variations in the degree of consequentialistic 
attitudes. 
Aim of the Current Pilot Study
 Given its preliminary nature and purpose, the aims 
and hypotheses presented below are exploratory. 
Firstly, the main aim was to be able to use factor 
analysis and reliability analysis techniques to extract 
at least three stories from each category. The three 
stories to be chosen from each category needed to 
have a decent degree of correlation with each other, 
therefore requiring an alpha value of 0.6 or greater to 
be acceptable for future use.
 Secondly, the MAQ had the main focus of 
detecting individual and group differences. For 
this reason, stories were purposely written in 
order to evoke a large degree of variability in the 
answers offered by participants. The responses were 
rendered on an ordinal scale with the purpose of 
differentiating between participants in terms of 
how consequentialistic their attitudes were relative 
to others. It was thought that the ideal story would 
produce responses that were not overly skewed and 
with a high degree of variability in the responses.
Third, attitudes and expected behavior were thought 
likely to be positively correlated but not identical 
among the categories. 
 Finally, sex differences were explored as one 
possible predictor for the degree of consequentialist 
attitudes on the assumption of more evolutionarily 
based categories of partiality towards family and 
suicide. 
Methodology
Participants 
 A total of 103 participants (25 male; 78 female) 
served in this study. All were Japanese-speaking 
university students at the International Christian 
University (ICU) in Mitaka, Tokyo, Japan. The 
participants ranged in age from 18 to 26 with a mean 
age of 19.88. The participants were recruited from 
members of an introductory course in psychology as 
well as on an individual basis by the experimenter. 
Instrument
 On the basis of a previous pilot-study, five 
stories in each category were constructed by the 
experimenter. Two bilingual Japanese graduate 
students translated these stories from the original 
English into natural Japanese. Several Japanese 
psychology scholars read and commented on the 
new translations before they were used in this 
study.  All stories described a morally disturbing 
and complicated situation from a third-person 
perspective. After each story two alternative endings 
(labeled A and B) followed.  One of the alternative 
endings was chosen to describe a typically 
consequentialistic act while the other ending 
described a typically non-consequentialistic act. 
 In all the stories in each category, the typical 
consequentialistic rationale “minimize the total 
suffering”, was contrasted against different non-
consequentialistic heuristics congruent with 
common sense morality. These heuristics was for 
the intentional act/foreseen omission stories (labeled 
A) “never intentionally kill another person”: For 
the family partiality stories (F), “always help your 
children”: For the number of victims stories (N) 
“always follow your heart”: For the retribution 
stories (R) “always punish criminals” and for the 
suicide stories (S) “never commit suicide”. The 
context varied among the stories, but the core moral 
difference between the alternative endings was 
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expected to be the distinction between minimized 
suffering on the one hand and non-consequentialistic 
aspects on the other hand. The stories can be 
provided by the author upon request.
 With a total of five stories in each of the five 
categories, the total number of stories was 25. As 
this was assumed to be too much of a burden in one 
session, two versions with 15 stories in each were 
constructed. In Version 1, the A, F and N categories 
were included while Version 2 consisted of the R, S 
and N categories. The N category was included twice 
as this was the category with the most extensive 
revisions since the previous pilot study. 
Procedure
 After indicating their sex and age on the face 
sheet, the participants read the stories. Each story 
was provided with two endings and participants were 
asked to use a 7-point Likert to indicate which of the 
two alternatives they personally believed to be the 
better of the two (1 = “A is much better than B”; 7 = 
“B is much better than A”; 4 = “A and B are equally 
good/equally bad”).
 The second question was directed towards 
expected behavior and how the participants thought 
they would act if they were in the same situation 
as the main person in the story. Participants were 
asked to use a 7-point Likert scale to indicate which 
alternative they believed they would be more likely 
act in accordance with (1 = “I am sure I would do A 
rather than B”, 7 = “I am sure I would do B rather 
than A”; 4 = “I have no idea what I would do/I 
would not do either A or B”).
Results
 Firstly, two separate factor analyses were 
conducted for version 1 and version 2 of the pilot 
study respectively in order to determine which of 
the stories best illustrated each category. As the main 
focus was on attitudes rather than expected behavior, 
stories were selected based only on the inter-story 
correlation on the attitudes-level. 
 Starting with version 1, all 15 stories from the 
A, N and F-categories were included in the first 
analysis. Three factors were hypothesized and as 
there was no presumption about whether or not the 
factors were correlated, the Varimax rotation method 
was chosen. In the first rotated factor matrix, Stories 
F1, F3 and F5 loaded most strongly under Factor 1. 
The four stories that loaded under Factor 2 were all 
from the A-category (A1, A3, A4, and A5). In the 
third factor, only one story (N1) fitted well.  After 
a reliability analysis on the five N-stories revealed 
very low inter-correlations overall (α = .289), all 
stories from this category were discarded from 
subsequent analyses.
 For the second factor analysis for the first version, 
the remaining A and F-stories were included and the 
Varimax rotation method yielded two factors. In the 
first factor all the F-stories loaded well and in the 
second factor all the A-stories loaded strongly. The 
three stories with the best factor loadings in each 
category were picked to represent each category. 
Hence the A3, A4 and A5-stories were chosen 
to measure attitudes towards the intentional act/
foreseen omission doctrine. An analysis of internal 
reliability revealed that these stories reached an alpha 
value of .679. F1, F3 and F5 were the stories chosen 
to measure the attitudes towards partiality against 
family. The alpha value for these was .696.
 After the N-stories were deleted, version 2 of 
the pilot study included the R and S-stories, and 
underwent the same kind of factor analysis. The first 
Varimax-rotated factor matrix yielded two factors, 
each of which consisted of a random mix of R and 
S-stories.  
 A detailed analysis of the inter-story correlations 
revealed that while the R-stories generally correlated 
weakly with each other, the R2 and R3-stories were 
moderately correlated (r = .41). The S-stories were 
all weakly correlated with each other. The story 
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that fitted least well was S2 and it was therefore 
excluded. 
 On basis of the inter-story correlations, a second 
factor analysis for the second version included the 
remaining stories. Two factors emerged from this 
analysis. For Factor 1 the R3, R2-stories factored 
best. For Factor 2, story S1 and S3 fitted well. For 
this reason only two R-stories (R2 & R3) were 
chosen as appropriate to measure attitude towards 
retribution. The alpha value for R2 and R3 were 
.583. Similarly, stories S1 and S3 were chosen 
to represent the rational suicide-category. The 
alpha values for S1 and S3 were .559. For story 
correlations within each category, see Table 1.
 The chosen stories were analyzed in greater detail 
in order to confirm they were not overly skewed or 
had an excessively low variance. Starting with the 
A-stories, the mean responses were slightly lower 
than anticipated, especially for the A3-story and the 
A4-story, but the variance was reasonably high. The 
F-stories generally showed acceptable, albeit low, 
means and good variances. Only F5 showed a slight 
degree of skewness. The R-stories showed near 
ideal means and a wide distribution of responses. 
The S-stories showed a low mean especially on the 
attitude-level. The variance however was acceptably 
large. See table 2 for detailed statistics.
 The attitudes and expected behaviors were 
moderately to strongly correlated over all the 
categories, but not strong enough to suggest that 
they were indistinguishable, (r = .513 – .756). The 
mean scores of attitudes and expected behavior were 
A-stories A3 A4 A5
A3 — .31* .24
A4   .46** —     .45**
A5 .35*   .44** —
Attitude α = .68                                 Expected behavior α = .60
Table 1   Inter-correlations for the stories chosen for the different categories
F-stories F1 F3 F5
F1 — .41** .28
F3     .55*** —     .45**
F5 .35* .40** —
Attitude α = .70                                 Expected behavior α = .65
R-stories R2 R3
R2 — .36*
R3 .41** —
Attitude α = .58                                  Expected behavior α = .53
S-stories S1 S3
S1 — .42**
S3 .39** —
Attitude α = .56                                  Expected behavior α = .59
Note: Intercorrelations for attitudes are shown below the diagonal, 
intercorrelations for expected behavior is shown above the diagonal.
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also compared using a paired sample t-test. The 
F-category showed a significant difference between 
mean score for attitude (M = 2.98) and expected 
behavior (M = 3.57), t (48) = -4.222, p < .001, while 
the others categories did not. Table 2 shows mean 
differences and correlations between the attitude-
level and expected behavior-level measures. 
 Possible sex differences were also investigated. 
Using a series of independent samples t-tests, mean 
differences were found only in the F-category. Males 
scored higher than females on both F-attitude (M = 
3.60 for males and M = 2.75 for females, t (50) = 
2.023, p = .048), and on F-expected behavior (M = 
4.45 for males and M = 3.25 for females, t (50) = 
2.704, p = .009). The other categories did not display 
any statistically significant sex differences (see table 
3 for details).
 In summary, three A-stories, three F-stories, two 
Story AttitudeMean (SD)
Exp. Behavior
Mean (SD)
Skewness
Attitude
Skewness 
Behavior t-value (df) r
A3 2.31 (1.56) 2.39 (1.58) 1.31 1.36 -0.438 (50)   .67***
A4 2.86 (1.65) 2.80 (1.78) 0.98 0.82 0.280 (50)   .62***
A5 4.06 (1.87) 3.48 (1.99) -0.17 0.27 2.687 (49)**   .69***
Total A 3.07 (1.32) 2.89 (1.33) 0.81 0.81 1.345 (49)   .73***
F1 3.55 (1.74) 4.20 (1.98) 0.19 -0.11 -2.619 (50)*   .55***
F3 2.80 (1.67) 3.80 (2.03) 0.83 0.31 -4.499 (50)***   .65***
F5 2.61 (1.86) 2.76 (1.96) 1.25 1.05 -0.756 (48)   .76***
Total F 2.98 (1.37) 3.57 (1.50) 0.70 0.31 -4.222 (48)***   .76***
R2 3.55 (1.87) 4.24 (2.16) 0.24 -0.02 -3.238 (49)**   .71***
R3 3.78 (2.07) 3.59 (2.34) 0.15 0.19 0.803 (49)   .69***
Total R 3.65 (1.66) 3.94 (1.86) 0.26 0.25 -1.565 (49)   .71***
S1 2.43 (1.60) 2.63 (1.97) 0.89 0.91 -0.843 (50)   .58***
S3 2.73 (1.73) 3.35 (1.98) 0.95 0.42 -2.252 (50)* .43**
Total S 2.58 (1.39) 2.99 (1.66) 0.54 0.59 -1.928 (50)   .51***
Note: *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Table 2   Mean and Skewness for the stories chosen. Mean difference and correlations between attitude-level and expected behavior level.
Table 3   Sex differences in mean scores for responses
Story Male Mean Female Mean t-value (df) Sig.
A Total Attitude 3.05 3.08 -0.069 (49) .945
Exp. Beh 3.14 2.79 0.849 (49) .400
F Total Attitude 3.60 2.75 2.023 (50) .048*
Exp. Beh 4.45 3.25 2.704 (50) .009**
R total Attitude 4.41 3.43 1.759 (49) .085
Exp. Beh ¹ 5.05 3.64 1.871 (12,7) .085
S Total Attitude 2.14 2.70 -1.196 (49) .238
Exp. Beh 3.14 2.95 0.326 (49) .746
Note: ¹ = Equal variances not assumed
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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R-stories and two S-stories can be said to measure 
the respective categories with acceptable reliability. 
The stories chosen showed a satisfactory variance 
and were not overly skewed. Attitudes and expected 
behavior correlated but were not indistinguishable.
Discussion
 The purpose was to develop an instrument (MAQ) 
that measure individual differences on a scale 
contrasting “consequentialistic attitudes” with “non-
consequentialistic attitudes congruent with common 
sense morality”.
 This pilot study revealed that the internal reliability 
of MAQ was slightly lower than anticipated, but two 
categories (A and F) at least reached the stipulated alpha 
value of 0.6. These weak inter-story correlations are 
comparable to other instruments designed to measure 
patterns in moral attitudes (Lombrozo, 2009), and 
can to some extent be attributed to the inherent 
design of the questionnaire. One innovative aspect 
of MAQ is the attempt to keep a balance between 
the narrowness and broadness of the moral stories 
in each of the categories. Story contents that are too 
broad will result in weak inter-story correlations as 
the contextual differences will tend to overshadow 
the similarities in moral theory. On the other hand, 
if the dilemmas are too narrow, the generalizability 
will be lower.  In this study, the purpose was to find 
a balance and to keep the focus of the stories narrow 
enough so the responses would relate to each other, 
but of sufficient breadth to keep some degree of 
generalizability. In retrospect, further narrowing 
might have been preferred, but at least for the A 
and F-categories, the three stories chosen related 
reasonably well with each other, indicating that they 
can be used as they are for future studies. 
 The stories within the N-category barely correlated 
at all and thus may not be measuring the same underlying 
structure. This might be attributable to the design 
of the N-stories. Morally important aspects such as 
intentions, certainty of outcome and severity of worst 
case scenario varied in the stories.  Alternatively, the 
failure to measure the N-category can be attributed 
to an unavoidable inconsistency in people’s attitudes 
when it comes to comparing qualitative and 
quantitative harm (Greene, 2007). 
 The R-category and S-category included stories 
that showed mixed inter-story correlations. The 
two stories that correlated well in the R-category 
(R2 and R3) were similar in content and described 
cases where one person could decide whether 
atrocious criminals ought either to suffer or to be 
treated compassionately in the future, keeping all 
other consequences constant. The other R-stories 
varied to a greater degree in context and hence did 
not correlate as well with each other. Due to this, an 
additional R-story, similar to the R2 and R3-stories, 
will be created for use in future studies.  The S-stories 
all had weak but similar positive internal correlations 
and the alpha-value decreased for every story 
removed.  As such, this category requires further 
refinement. 
 The explicit aim to create stories that produced 
varied responses even among a rather homogenous 
sample was quite successful. Some stories chosen 
to represent the categories had means lower than 
anticipated but the overall variance was high. It can 
be concluded that the stories chosen did evoke mixed 
responses indicating that moral attitudes differed 
among the participants as required for this type of 
instrument. 
 This study also illustrates in a general sense the 
nature of the relationship between attitudes and 
expected behavior. Morality if often divided into 
behavior and attitudes, but the level of analysis can 
be separated even further. The most empirical way 
to study morality is in the form of direct observation 
of behavior. While these studies are of great interest, 
there are several areas where it is simply not feasible 
to conduct experiments. A more commonly used 
level of analysis is the expected behavior level. This 
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is how a person believes that she would react in a 
hypothetical situation. This might or might not differ 
from actual behavior depending on individual or 
situational factors. 
 Attitudes can be measured either from a first 
person perspective (e.g., If you are in this situation, 
how should you behave?) or from a third-person 
“global” perspective (e.g., How should a person 
behave in this situation?) The current study 
contrasted the global attitude perspective with the 
expected behavior perspective. Based on the results 
it is fair to say that even if people usually believe 
that they would behave in a similar way to how 
they think people should behave, these two are not 
identical. The correlations between the attitude-level 
and expected behavior-level ranged from 0.76 for the 
F-category to 0.51 for the S-category, indicating that 
people expect that they sometimes will not act in the 
same way they think is the morally correct way from 
a global point of view. 
 Looking at the mean scores for both attitudes and 
expected behavior, the only significant difference 
was found in the F-category. Participants had quite 
agent-neutral attitudes, but often admitted that in 
many cases they would not live up to their moral 
standards and behave in a partial way even if they 
recognized the moral problems with this. This is an 
expected result. Universalism is a well-known and 
applauded foundation for abstract (western) ethics, 
but simultaneously, partiality towards one’s family 
is the behavioral default deeply imprinted in our 
most basic emotions (Haidt & Kesebir, in press). 
This may well explain some of the well-researched 
dissonances between judgment and justification 
(Hauser et al., 2007).
 The most widespread way to measure moral 
attitudes is to ask either which behavior is “morally 
right/wrong” or if a person “should be punished” 
(Haidt, Koller & Dias, 1993). In the MAQ, 
attitudes were instead measured by asking which 
of the two presented alternatives was seen as the 
comparably “better” of the two. This method of 
responding was chosen in order to separate the 
often confused concepts of “good and bad”, “right 
and wrong”, and “praiseworthy and blameworthy”. 
A consequentialist might judge a certain state of 
the world as “worse”, but at the same time be very 
reluctant to level blame or to describe it as a moral 
wrongdoing. For example, it is possible to describe 
a tsunami or earthquake as “bad” because it causes 
a lot of suffering but it can hardly be considered as a 
wrongdoing. 
 As the purpose of this pilot study was to lay 
the groundwork for a major future study of moral 
attitudes and decision making, the only variable 
included in this pilot study was the participant’s sex. 
Studies in moral psychology within the intentional 
action/foreseen omission category have generally 
not found any sex differences (Cushman, 2006) 
and this result was supported in the present study. 
However, it is interesting to note that the male 
participants scored higher on both the attitude level 
and expected behavior level on the F-stories. This 
implies that male participants not only believe 
that they would behave in a more partial manner 
but also that they have less agent-neutral attitudes 
than female participants. This might be a result of 
uneven social desirability between male and female 
participants where females simply are less sincere in 
their attitude responses. Alternatively, females might 
answer the questionnaire in a more thoughtful way 
compared to males more intuitive judgments (Greene, 
2007). 
Implications for a Future Major Study
 On the basis of the results of this pilot study, 
the major study to follow will include a number 
of independent variables and the degree of 
consequentialistic vs. non-consequentialistic 
common sense-attitudes will be used as the 
dependent variable. One of these independent 
variables will be preferred information processing 
Educational Studies 52
International Christian University
108
style as suggested by Pacini and Epstein (1999). 
They argue that rationality and intuitivism are two 
orthogonal variables that together predict how 
different people reach their judgments in different 
situations. The person high on rationality and low on 
intuition will be more inclined and more competent 
to calculate cost and benefits. Persons with high 
trust in their intuitions but low rationality will be 
much more prone to make quick decisions on the 
basis of their “gut-feelings.” This gives support 
to the hypothesis that “rational people” will show 
spontaneously more consequentialistic attitudes 
compared to “intuitive people” (Greene, 2007). The 
REI-scale developed by Pacini and Epstein exists 
in a validated Japanese version (Naito, Suzuki, & 
Sakamoto, 2004) and will be included in the major 
study to follow.
 After the “affective revolution” in moral 
psychology, moral emotions such as anger, disgust 
and empathy are these days not seen as side-
products, but as genuine origins of moral judgments 
(Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Kesebir, in press). Greene 
(2007) agrees with this but categorize emotions as 
either currency emotions or alarm bell emotions. 
Currency emotions work as either pluses or 
minuses and can be used in conscious cost-benefit 
analyses. In contrast alarm-bell emotions are non-
compromising and cause judgments and behaviors 
directly, without entering any conscious processes. 
The idea is that moral emotions predict behavior 
in all people, but while they predict in an indirect 
and conditional way (via currency emotions) for 
some people, they predict behavior directly and 
unconditionally for others.
 In summary, this pilot study has proven valuable 
in contributing to the process of developing a 
questionnaire for measuring individual or cultural 
differences in degree of consequentialistic moral 
attitudes. The next step is to analyze the relation 
between the different categories. If Greene’s (2007) 
speculation is correct, consequentialistic attitudes 
in one category should predict consequentialistic 
attitudes in other categories as well, but this is 
still very tentative. The major study to follow will 
also investigate the relation between individual 
differences in preferred information processing style, 
intensity of moral emotions and moral attitudes.
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